same as those used in Yang et al. (2006) . They all showed reliable age-related declines and substantial retest learning effects in old age (Yang et al., 2006) . This enables betweenstudy comparisons to determine the contribution of itemspecifi c effects in different ability domains. Finally, the Beck Anxiety Inventory (BAI; Beck & Steer, 1993 ) was administered at pretest and posttest to evaluate the possibility that a reduction in anxiety would mediate retest effects.
In sum, this study aims to determine the existence of non-item-specifi c retest learning and the contributions of item-specifi c effects and anxiety to retest learning in older adults.
M ethods

Participants
Thirty-one healthy community-dwelling older adults (ages 60 -82 years, M = 71.10, SD = 6.27), including 26 women and 5 men, participated in this study. They were well educated based on their years of education ( M = 17.65, SD = 4.40) and scores on the Shipley Vocabulary test ( M = 36.61, SD = 3.48; Shipley, 1946 ) . They rated themselves as healthy on a 1 -10 scale ( M = 7.74, SD = 1.37). All of them scored below the cutoff of 6 ( M = 1.29, SD = 1.60) on the Short Blessed test (SBT; Katzman et al., 1983 ) .
Materials
The tests used in the retest sessions were two Inductive Reasoning measures: letter series (LS) and number series (NS; Blieszner, Willis, & Baltes, 1981 ) ; two Perceptual Speed tests: digit symbol substitution test (DSST; Wechsler, 1981 ) and letter comparison (LC; Salthouse, 1991 ) , and one Visual Attention test: D2 test (D2; Brickenkamp, 1994 Letter Series and Number Series. -The tests require participants to fi gure out a pattern/rule based on a series of letters/numbers and then identify one letter/number that could best continue the pattern. The time limit was 6 min. Four parallel versions were developed for each test. Parallel versions were developed following the rules described in a previous study ( Allaire & Marsiske, 2005 ) . We fi rst parsed each item in the parent tests into the specifi c rules/patterns and then developed a new item by shifting each letter alphabetically or shifting each number in numeric order so that the new item and the parent item follow the same pattern/ rule. For instance, the item " g a f a e a___ " could be changed into " h b g b f b___ , " and the item " 12, 13, 10, 11___ " could be modifi ed into " 14, 15, 12, 13___ " in a parallel version of LS and NS, respectively. The alternative answer choices were accordingly generated by shifting each letter or number by a certain number of steps in alphabetic or numeric order.
Digit Symbol Substitution Test. -This test requires participants to substitute as many digits as possible with the corresponding symbols within a 90-s time limit. Eight parallel versions were developed by pseudo-randomly assigning each digit a different symbol for each new version so that none of the digit -symbol pairs repeated across versions.
Letter Comparison. -In this test, participants compare and determine whether two letter strings are the same or different within 1 min. Eight parallel versions were developed for LC. To develop parallel versions for LC, we fi rst split the two pages for each of the three sections (containing three-letter, six-letter, and nine-letter strings, respectively) to make the two new parent versions so that each parent version contained one page for each section. Then we replaced each consonant letter in the parent items by a new consonant letter that did not appear in any parent test items (e.g., " C " was replaced by " G " ) to develop the fi rst two alternate versions. Finally, we reversed each pair of letters in all the parent items (e.g., " C " reversed with " L " ) or in the items of the fi rst two alternate version (e.g., " G " reversed with " B " ) to further develop four new alternate versions.
D2
Test. -In this test, participants visually detect two target symbols, for example, a letter " d " with one ( ' ) or two marks ( " ) above and/or underneath, from all other similar symbols (e.g., a letter " d " with different mark patterns, a letter " p " with various mark patterns). Four parallel versions were developed, each containing two unique target items. Time limit was 80 s.
Procedure
Data were collected in a 10-session training course, comprising pretest, eight sessions of self-guided retest training (twice a week), and posttest. We used the same self-guided retest paradigm as in Yang et al. (2006) where participants were repeatedly tested without receiving any external guidance or feedback. Different from Yang et al., a unique parallel version of each test was administered at each retest session. To maintain participants ' interest, one of the principal researchers gave a lecture at each session on various topics addressed in an undergraduate Introduction to Psychology course. The training tests were integrated into the 1-hr lecture and administered under standard timed conditions. The order of tests for the three target abilities was counterbalanced across sessions. To minimize fatigue effects, three tests were given at each session. DSST was given at all eight sessions. LC and NS were given at sessions 2, 4, 6, and 8. LS and D2 were given at sessions 1, 3, 5, and 7.
R esults
Overall, 4.91% of the 713 attainable data points were missing due to participants ' absence or being late. The missing data points were replaced by the individual linear regression estimates following an established procedure ( Lindenberger & Baltes, 1997 ) . Further analyses showed the participants who missed data points ( n = 10) and those who completed all the sessions ( n = 21) did not differ in most demographic variables ( p s > .21) except that participants with missing data points were older than those without ( p = .001). Nevertheless, the covariance analyses including the completion status as covariate did not change the main result patterns, and the data analyses based on Listwise deletion of missing data points revealed virtually identical result patterns. To provide a common baseline and enable between-test comparisons, we transformed raw scores (number of correct solutions) into T scores for each test ( M = 50, SD = 10), standardized to the fi rst training session. Session 5 of the D2 test was excluded from the fi nal analyses due to a technical problem with the stopwatch in precisely timing the task.
Retest Learning Effects
Number of correct solutions (T scores). - Figure 1 shows the mean T scores for the number of correct solutions. The repeated-measures analyses of variance (ANOVAs) were conducted in each ability domain, with linear (i.e., incremental improvement) and quadratic (i.e., saturation) contrasts specifi ed. Both Perceptual Speed tests (DSST and LC) showed signifi cant retest learning in linear, F s > 24.35, p s < .001, ŋ 2 s > .44, and quadratic trends, F s > 15.90, p s < .001, ŋ 2 s > .34. The composite Inductive Reasoning scores (i.e., average T scores of LS and NS) showed a signifi cant linear effect, F (1, 30) = 20.56, p < .001, MSE = 10.15, ŋ 2 = .41; but no quadratic effect, F < 1. The Visual Attention test (D2) also showed a reliable linear effect, F (1, 30) = 22.19, p < .001, MSE = 43.66, ŋ 2 = .43; but no quadratic effect, F < 1.
Accuracy. -The same sets of ANOVAs on accuracy (i.e., proportion of correct solutions out of all attempted items) revealed that only the linear improvement in Inductive Reasoning was signifi cant, F (1, 30) = 5.17, p < .05, MSE = 0.01, ŋ 2 = .15. All other effects were not signifi cant, F s < 2.39, p s > .13. The increase in accuracy suggests training-induced improvement in strategy use in Inductive Reasoning ( Boron, Turiano, Willis, & Schaie, 2007 ) .
Retest learning rate (slope). -
The analysis on the individual slope estimates revealed different learning rates across ability domains, F (2, 60) = 7.14, p < .01, MSE = 8.49, ŋ 2 = .19. Visual Attention ( M = 3.95, SD = 4.67) and Perceptual Speed ( M = 2.42, SD = 1.49) did not differ in learning rate ( p = .09); however, both showed a steeper rate than Inductive Reasoning ( M = 1.16, SD = 1.42), F s (1, 30) > 10.37, ps < .01, ŋ 2 s > .25
The Contribution of Item-Specifi c Effects
To examine the contribution of item-specifi c effects in different ability domains, we compared the retest learning effect size (i.e., the gain T scores divided by baseline standard deviation in each test) across the equal number of training sessions between this study and Yang et al. 
The Contribution of Anxiety
Two participants missed BAI at posttest and were thus excluded from the analysis. Overall, BAI scores (collapsed over pretest and posttest) showed consistent negative correlations with the average T scores and accuracy (collapsed across retest sessions) in all the tests ( r s = − .14 to − .72). The correlations were signifi cant in Reasoning ( r s < − .35, p s ≤ .05) and Attention ( r s < − .55, p s < .001). However, BAI scores did not change from pretest ( M = 6.71, SD = 6.59) to posttest ( M = 6.10, SD = 6.69), t < 1, and they did not correlate with the retest learning effect size ( r s < 0.26) in all the tests. Moreover, the retest learning effects remained significant even after controlling for anxiety in the covariance analyses. In sum, anxiety neither changes with retest practice nor contributes to the non-item-specifi c retest learning.
D iscussion
This study provides the fi rst direct empirical evidence that retest learning in older adults may occur in the absence of perceptual item-specifi c effects. Overall, the training gain corresponds to 0.33 -1.35 SD units from baseline performances (DSST: 1.35; LC: 0.61; LS: 0.39; NS: 0.33; D2: 0.74).
Although the specifi c nature of the non-item-specifi c retest learning remains to be specifi ed, our data suggest that anxiety is not a critical factor. Based on previous fi ndings that training-induced increases in accuracy refl ect improved strategy use ( Boron et al., 2007 ) , we infer from the result of training-induced accuracy improvement in Inductive Reasoning that retest learning in Inductive Reasoning is driven by spontaneous strategy use through mastering and applying the rules to solve new items at a conceptual level. In contrast, the retest learning in Perceptual Speed and Visual Attention was mainly manifested in response speed rather than accuracy, suggesting that retest learning in these domains may be primarily driven by item-general effects through familiarity with the testing situation or skill-based procedural learning (e.g., better eye -hand coordination and visual scanning). Furthermore, the fl atter learning rate (slope) in Inductive Reasoning than in the other two domains may be driven by the differentially higher complexity of the Inductive Reasoning tests, which involve multiple complex rules (such as repetitions, skips, forward and backward orders identifi ed in Saczynski et al., 2002 ) . In contrast, the Perceptual Speed and Visual Attention tests involve very simple rules that apply to all the items in each test.
The between-study comparison suggests that itemspecifi c effects only occur in Inductive Reasoning, perhaps due to the relatively complex surface structures of the items and the multiple solution rules. In contrast, the simple items and the solution rules in the Perceptual Speed and Visual Attention tests expose minimal requirement on item-specifi c effects.
Some limitations should be noted. First, the current sample involves well-educated and highly functioning participants and thus limits the generalization of the fi ndings. Second, direct within-study manipulation will certainly strengthen our current between-study comparison that was based on a relatively small sample. Nevertheless, our results made significant contributions to the cognitive training literature by providing direct empirical evidence that retest learning in older adults is driven, at least in part, by item-general factors not captured by item-specifi c learning or anxiety.
